Governance implications for the implementation of biodegradable gillnets in Norway by Standal, Dag et al.
Marine Policy 122 (2020) 104238
Available online 15 October 2020
0308-597X/© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Full length article 
Governance implications for the implementation of biodegradable gillnets 
in Norway 
Dag Standal a,*, Eduardo Grimaldo a, Roger B. Larsen b 
a SINTEF Ocean, Brattørkaia 17C, N-7010 Trondheim, Norway 
b The Arctic University of Norway, UiT, N-9037 Tromsø, Norway   








A B S T R A C T   
Gillnets are among the most widely used fishing gear in global fisheries because of their simplicity, high oper-
ability, catch efficiency and low entrance cost for fishermen. In Norway, the Northeast Atlantic (NEA) cod (Gadus 
morhua) fishing industry represents the most important economic single species fishery and the gillnet fishery 
accounts for 24% of the national total allowable catch (TAC) of NEA cod. Despite the importance of the gillnet 
fishery in Norway, significant amounts of gillnets are lost at sea each year. As gillnets are made of synthetic 
materials (i.e. nylon) with high breaking strength and durability, lost, abandoned and/or discarded fishing gear 
(LADFG) continues catching target and non-target species for years. This phenomenon, known as "ghost fishing", 
cause negative impact on the benthic marine environment and to the fisheries management. Over the last years, 
the development of biodegradable gillnets to replace traditional nylon gillnets has become particularly sought 
after in fisheries worldwide. However, biodegradable gillnets are less efficient and more expensive than tradi-
tional nylon gillnets. As the urgency to eliminate the negative environmental impacts of LADFG increases, a 
crucial question remains how to successfully implement biodegradable gillnets to replace the more efficient 
nylon gillnets currently used in commercial fisheries. In this article we investigate how central elements of 
fisheries management may be used to implement biodegradable gillnets and how this may challenge the current 
resource allocation policy among different gear- and vessel groups.   
1. Introduction 
Globally, gillnets are among the most common fishing gear adopted 
in both developing- and industrialized countries [1]. Gillnets may be 
used for demersal- and pelagic fisheries, and by vessels ranging from 
artisanal- to deep-sea vessels. The popularity of gillnets is determined by 
their simple- and open technology and low entrance cost to commercial 
fisheries. Therefore, gillnets are often considered an essential compo-
nent for the maintenance of especially coastal fisheries, local value- 
chains and employment systems in fisheries-dependent areas [2,3]. 
Gillnets are also widely used in commercial fisheries throughout the 
North-east Atlantic Ocean (NEA), especially by the coastal fleet. In 
Norway, the NEA cod (Gadus morhua) fishery represents the most 
important economic single species fishery. For the coastal fleet, gillnets 
accounted for 24% of the national total allowable catch (TAC) of NEA 
cod in 2019 [4]. Coastal- and inshore fisheries are especially adapted to 
the NEA cod’s migrating pattern. During the winter season (Januar-
y–April), most of the adult population of the NEA cod stock migrate to 
adjacent waters off the Lofoten archipelago (northern Norway) for 
spawning. As cod is easily available in this period, gillnet fisheries are 
generally viewed as a low cost, catch- and fuel-efficient activities [5–7], 
contributing to the large seasonality of the fishery [8]. In addition, the 
gillnet fishery also represents the potential to produce low quality fish, 
which impact the value creation throughout industrial value-chains [9] 
(i.e. if the soaking-time for gillnets is too long, the fish quality may be 
heavily reduced [10]). 
However, despite the popularity of gillnet fisheries, grave environ-
mental concerns arise from the significant number of gillnets lost at sea 
every year [11,12].1 This lost, abandoned and/or discarded fishing gear 
(LADFG) continues catching target and non-target species, a phenome-
non known as "ghost fishing", and causes negative impacts on the 
benthic environment. The exact figure that quantifies the impact of 
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unintended capture by LADFG is not known, but it is widely acknowl-
edged that ghost fishing increase the fishing mortality (F), contributes to 
alternative economic losses and undermine the principles for a sus-
tainable fisheries management [12]. LADFG also contributes to plastic 
pollution entering the marine trophic chain, which requires additional 
costs related to clean-up operations and ultimately has a negative 
cascading effect on other business- and social activities [13]. 
The extent and gravity of the problem increased significantly with 
the introduction of synthetic fibers made of polyamide (nylon), a tech-
nological advancement that augmented fishing capacity and economic 
profitability of fisheries worldwide [13]. As gillnets are made of syn-
thetic materials with high breaking strength and durability and are 
placed at strategic points on the migration routes of target species (NEA 
cod), LADFG may fish significant amounts of fish for years at sea. 
The international recognition of the challenge posed by LADFG is 
demonstrated by the large number of international organizations and 
agreements that focus on LADFG [13–15]. Efforts to assess the envi-
ronmental impact of LADFG are extensively documented in the litera-
ture [13,16,17] and several initiatives to reduce the negative effects of 
LADFG (e.g., collection of used gillnets, measures to trace/track LADFG 
and the development of biodegradable fishing gear) have gained 
increased interest and popularity [13]. Over the last decade, the 
development of biodegradable gillnets to replace traditional nylon 
gillnets has become particularly sought after in fisheries worldwide 
[13]. The basic idea is that biodegradable gillnets break down and, if 
lost, disappear after a specific amount of time at sea, thus, preventing 
the occurrence of ghost fishing and the impacts related to LADFG. 
However, extensive fishing trials for NEA cod, carried out in Nor-
wegian waters have proven biodegradable gillnets to be less efficient in 
terms of catch per unit effort (CPUE) than traditional gillnets made of 
nylon [18–20]. In addition, biodegradable gillnets are more expensive 
than nylon gillnets. The use of biodegradable gillnets, thus, represents 
an initial extra cost for small-scale gillnet fisheries. However, in a long 
term perspective, the removal of LADFG may contribute to a collective 
gain in terms of a better fisheries management, larger fish stocks and 
quotas for all gear- and vessel groups (trawl, line, demersal seining, 
jigging, etc.) harvesting the NEA cod stock. 
Despite the negative impacts derived from ghost fishing, the exten-
sive use of gillnets by the coastal fleet constitutes a strong position 
among fishers and in the political landscape. Maintenance of a large 
coastal fleet to support the social fabric in fisheries dependent areas are 
prioritized policy goals in Norway. An initial public decree to heavily 
restrict or prohibit gillnet fisheries, are thus not a viable political option. 
Instead, as technological alternatives are available, public authorities, 
the gear-industry and research and development institutions seek to find 
incentives to stimulate the fishers towards more sustainable alternatives, 
which can replace the use of nylon gillnets. 
In this article, our main research question is to what extent an 
institutional approach may effectively favour the implementation of 
biodegradable gillnets in NEA cod fisheries. We investigate how central 
elements of fisheries management (i.e. use of quota resource allocation 
regime) may be used to achieve specific policy goals such us imple-
menting biodegradable gillnets and how this may challenge the current 
resource allocation policy among different gear- and vessel groups. The 
article is organized in the following sections: in Section 2, we present a 
framework aimed at understanding the central position of coastal gillnet 
fisheries in Norway and how new stakeholders introduce new values and 
norms to the sustainability discourse. In Section 3, we outline the impact 
of lost gillnets, the catch rates and potential value losses for commercial 
gillnet fisheries. In Section 4, we discuss how fish quotas may be used as 
governance initiatives to stimulate the transition towards the use of 
biodegradable gillnets. We outline how the individual and collective 
gains oppose each other and how the principles of resource allocation 
regime may be used to implement biodegradable gillnets and avoid 
ghost fishing. 
2. Conceptual framework 
In Norway, discussions about technological adaptations of fishing 
gear and their effects on biological, economic, and social sustainability 
have always been a priority on fisheries’ political agendas [21–24]. The 
common property theory’s fundamental assumption is that fish re-
sources are a common property and they are limited. For the individual 
fisherman it is rational to maximize the economic values derived from 
their allocated quotas. Since the introduction of a TAC regime in 1977, 
technological adaptations to fisheries have been a controversial subject, 
resulting in severe resource allocation conflicts among different gear 
and vessel groups [25]. Industrial stakeholders, such as the land-based 
fillet processing industry, argue that coastal seasonal fisheries are not 
able to provide the processing industry with a stable fish supply. The 
industry thus advocates deep-sea trawling to secure year-round supplies 
to maintain employment and meet the demand of international markets 
[26]. Opposing the industrial approach, stakeholders from fisheries 
dependent regions and local communities support coastal fisheries and 
small-scale entrepreneurs, viewing them as the most sustainable busi-
ness model. Coastal fisheries’ seasonal activity, which is based on NEA 
cod’s migrating pattern, supports the basic structures of fisheries- 
dependent regions, especially in the northern Norway. Therefore, fish-
ing with gillnets and other conventional gear (i.e., lines, pots, and seine), 
represents a natural adaptation, necessary to maintain a decentralized 
production system, while large-scale industrial structures are perceived 
as a threat to the way of living of local fishing communities [27]. 
Discourses and divergent views about the use of specific technolo-
gies, often mirror how different stakeholders define problems and 
address solutions in society. Such processes can be described as a framing 
process. According to Bijker [28], a frame is a boundary and framing is 
the process of producing this boundary. The concept of technological 
frames refers to the ways in which relevant social groups (e.g., industry, 
coastal fishermen, fisheries authorities, or local communities) evaluate 
the effects of different technological adaptations. Relevant for harvest-
ing limited fish resources, the concept of technological frames is a way of 
interpreting the technological adaptations regarding sustainability, the 
appropriate structures for solving the problems and the institutional 
requirements a solution may meet. In this context, a technological frame 
is a socially constructed combination, reflecting current theories, tacit 
knowledge, engineering practices and bargaining among different 
stakeholders. 
The theory that defines technology as a social construct suggests that 
the reasons for the acceptance or rejection of specific technologies (e.g., 
those employed in coastal vessel and gillnet fisheries) reside in society 
itself [28,29]. Based on this concept, actors within the field of social 
constructivism are engaged in dissociating the primary cause from the 
individual inventor (or technical “genius”), by removing the boundaries 
between technical, social, economic and political processes connected to 
technological adaptations. 
Within this framework, one cannot explain the success of specific 
technological adaptations by saying that they are merely “the best” or 
isolated achievements of skillful engineering. Instead, one must inves-
tigate how the criteria of “being the best” are defined and how they 
reflect society. It is necessary to consider which groups and stakeholders 
participate in creating the definitions by which success or failures are 
measured. Consequently, in a social constructivist perspective, tech-
nology is not decoupled or isolated from factors related to law, eco-
nomics, politics and institutions operating within society [28]. 
For generations, coastal fisheries and the use of conventional gear, 
such as gillnets, seines, lines and pots, also known as the conventional 
fleet, have represented a simple, cheap and highly efficient technology 
adaptation to the local environment, essential to maintain employment 
in fisheries-dependent communities and small-scale production systems 
[7]. The central position of coastal fisheries wanting to maintain local 
ownership in these regions is also supported by the Norwegian Fisher-
men’s Association (NFA), which states that coastal fisheries shall be the 
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profound backbone of the national fishing fleet [30]. The strong position 
of coastal fisheries is also reflected in public policy goals and expressed 
in the important resource allocation keys of TAC’s among different gear- 
and vessel groups; particularly for the important and most valuable NEA 
cod fisheries in the high north [25,31,32]. Fig. 1 shows how the Fisheries 
Directorate [33] divided the national TAC of NEA cod (376,575 tonnes) 
among groups in 2018. 
In 2018, 69% of the NEA cod TAC (259,837 tonnes) was allocated to 
vessels fishing with conventional gear, such as gillnets (96,766 tonnes), 
longlines (79,576 tonnes) and demersal seines (87,838 tonnes), while 
31% was allocated to the trawler fleet (112,125 tonnes). Other fishing 
gears (purse seine, pots and traps) accounted for the rest of the TAC [4]. 
Within the conventional fleet, the year-round costal fleet (closed group) 
was allocated the largest share among all groups (72.4% of the con-
ventional fleet), while the open group (part-time fishermen) was allo-
cated 8.6% of the conventional fleets’ group quota. The deep-sea 
conventional fleet, mainly fishing with longline, was allocated 12% of 
the quota. In the last decade, the numbers of deep-sea vessel (over 28 m) 
within the coastal fleet has increased rapidly, from 17 vessels in 2008 to 
64 vessels in 2014, with these vessels having quotas from steadily 
smaller coastal vessel groups, even below 11 m [34]. Likewise, there is a 
tendency that deep-sea conventional vessels gradually change from the 
use of long-line and gillnets to long-line and demersal seines, e.g. the 
vessel M/S Atlantic [35]. The landing of the conventional fleet in the last 
20 years is shown in Fig. 2. 
According to Armstrong [36], resource allocation among gear and 
vessel groups is not based on science, (i.e., on which technological ad-
aptations or fleet structures fulfil specific requirements). Instead, it is 
based political goals to maintain a diverse fleet structure and on his-
torical catch shares among different gear and vessel groups prior to the 
closing of the commons in 1991 [37]. In order to establish a stable and 
predictable quota allocation regime the Norwegian Fishermen’s Asso-
ciation (NFA) proposed the introduction of allocation keys among 
groups. First, the system outlined a simple group division of cod quotas 
between the fleet fishing with conventional gears and the trawler fleet. 
When the individual vessel quota system (IVQ) was introduced to the 
coastal fleet and the deep-sea long line fleet during the early 1990’s, the 
resource allocation regime became more detailed. In this setting the 
trawler fleet, the coastal fleet and the deep-sea long line fleet were 
allocated specific percentage shares of a given TAC of NEA cod [25]. 
In a long-term, resource allocation keys are essential to secure 
coastal fisheries and local production systems. Transfer of quotas across 
the deep-sea fleet and coastal vessels, due to the ITQ’s, is thus forbidden. 
While LADFG has not traditionally been a cause of concern, due to the 
historic traditions of using gillnets the negative impact on marine 
ecosystems have now gained increased attention. New stakeholders, 
such as environmental NGOs, joined the debate and brought new per-
spectives to gillnet fisheries and to the sustainability discourse. In 
addition, the ecosystem management approach outlined by the Ocean 
resources Act [38] have gained increased momentum. The employment 
of gillnets, once accepted as a natural adaptation to the local environ-
ment, is now challenged by new sustainability imperatives, which were 
not previously part of the traditional coastal fisheries’ attributes. 
As new stakeholders join the discourse, it is essential to understand 
how different actors or social groups seek to impose- and defend 
different interests, values and norms in the sustainability discourse. In 
this setting, stakeholders with a stronger environmental perspective 
view gillnet fishery as a source of LADFG and consequently see ghost 
fishing as a threat to the management of fish resources, causing negative 
impacts on marine ecosystems [15]. The various ways of evaluating 
specific technologies also reflect how different interests interpret 
different understandings of artefacts, their technical characteristics and 
ultimately their effects on the environment and society. In this context, 
the choice of a technology that are accepted or rejected in society, does 
not necessarily need to be based on “true” or objective values (i.e. most 
efficient, most profitable, easiest to handle, most environmentally 
friendly); it also depends on which stakeholders manage to gain 
acceptance of their business views, by promoting a strategy, defining the 
problems and presenting the right solutions to fulfil their self-interest in 
the political landscape. In the recent years, due to the increased focus on 
fisheries to fulfill environmental sustainability attributes (i.e. Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC) standards [15]), the implementation of 
biodegradable gillnets to avoid ghost fishing has gained increased 
importance. 
As different fisheries technologies represent different properties due 
to i.e. efficiency, handling and operating cost, choices of technologies 
may also reflect conflicting goals. In this context, fishing with i.e. nylon 
gillnets may benefit the coastal fishermen but may be less sustainable 
than degradable gillnets, due to ghost fishing Hence, as different tech-
nologies are available, choices of technologies may also correspond to 
the "prisoner’s dilemma". In this perspective, specific choices may 
benefit individuals or specific groups, but may not benefit the commons 
or all gear- and vessel groups harvesting NEA cod [39]. 
3. Gillnet fisheries in Norway 
In 2019, the coastal fleet comprised 5 712 vessels smaller than 
27.9 m. Of these, 96% were smaller than 14.9 m [4] and freely allowed 
to choose between conventional gears (gillnet, lines, longlines, seines, 
pots). Since most of the vessels are smaller than 14.9 m are unable to 
Fig. 1. The NEA cod quota allocation system,21 different gear- and vessel groups in 2018. 
Source: Fisheries Directorate [33]. 
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operate demersal seines, they use gillnets, which are a very efficient, 
cheap, and easy to handle fishing gear. In 2019, vessels smaller than 
27.9 m were responsible for 89% of the gillnet landings (79,119 tonnes) 
of NEA cod and a first-hand value of 1.68 billion NOK (Table 1). The 
NEA cod fishery is highly seasonal, with the largest catches during the 
winter season (January–April) [8]. 
The standard operating procedure of a gillnetter is that vessels leave 
the port before dawn and head for the fishing grounds close to the 
mainland, where gillnets are organized in different sets and positioned 
at various locations. Commonly, gillnets are hauled in the morning and 
deployed during the middle of the day or afternoon. Normally, gillnets 
are hauled after a maximum soaking time of 24 h to enhance efficiency 
and fish quality. Today, coastal vessels are equipped with electronic 
navigation systems and acoustic fish detection devices (i.e., sonars and 
echosounders), and gillnetters use automatic net haulers and net 
clearers that allow vessels to be operated efficiently by small crews. The 
number of gillnets used by the coastal fleet varies according to the size of 
the vessel. Vessels smaller than 11 m, normally operated by one or two 
persons, use 80–100 gillnets3 per fishing trip, while vessels between 20 
and 27.9 m, with four to five crew members, operate 180–220 nets. As 
gillnet fisheries for NEA cod target the adult population migrating 
during the winter season, coastal fisheries are described as energy effi-
cient, due to low fuel consumption per kg of caught fish [40]. 
Furthermore, according to the Fisheries Directorate [41], the coastal 
fleet also showed positive operating profits over the last few years. 
However, despite the GPS systems used for accurate gillnet locali-
zation, a significant proportion of gillnets is lost at sea every year. 
Deshpandea et al. [42] provided estimates of the annual loss rates of six 
types of fishing gear in Norway and identified gillnets as the primary 
source of LADFG. Although fisheries authorities lack an exact figure for 
the amount of lost gillnets, estimates from the Norwegian Environment 
Agency [11] suggest that more than 13,700 gillnets are lost each year,4 
while estimates from the Fisheries Directorate [12] suggest that the 
number is closer to 1000 gillnets per year.5 Norway is one of the few 
countries that has a program in place to systematically retrieve lost gear 
from high fishing pressure areas. Since 1983, more than 22,000 gillnets 
(and associated buoy-lines) have been retrieved. The annual number 
varied between 106 and 1180 retrieved gillnets, with a mean number 
(±SD) of 583 ± 279 gillnets per year. As gillnets are located in abundant 
fishing grounds, retrieved ghost gear often contains large amounts of 
fish and other benthic species. The variable number of retrieved gillnets 
is mainly associated with uncertainties about their position and highly 
demanding retrieval operations [12] (Fig. 3). It is important to mention 
that the majority of gillnet fisheries harvesting NEA cod operate at great 
depths and in areas affected by strong currents. In the event a gillnet 
breaks near the surface (or the buoy-line near the gillnet), it may drift 
Fig. 2. Landing of NEA cod by the Norwegian conventional fleet in the period 2000–2019. 
Source: Fisheries Directorate [4]. 
Table 1 
Gillnet landings of NEA cod (tonnes) and first-hand value (1000 NOK)a divided by the total coastal fleet’s length groups.  
Length group 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Landing Value Landing Value Landing Value Landing Value 
Under 11 m 34,068 444,122 36,261 529,977 39,087 647,274 30,319 622,283 
11–14.9 m 35,403 481,216 37,408 568,935 35,245 601,762 29,314 618,568 
15–20.9 m 8068 112,469 7594 114,944 6210 106,635 6400 136,707 
21–27.9 m 8,281 132,156 6833 114,776 5320 101,673 4202 95,164 
Over 28 m 4,441 75,958 6096 114,011 5315 117,649 4328 106,609 
Otherb 4,635 69,101 5736 100,838 5589 112,986 4540 104,135 
SUM 94,896 1,315,022 99,928 1 543,481 96,766 1,687,979 79,119 1,683,466  
a The statistics are based on landing and final data submitted by the Norwegian fish sales organizations to the Fisheries Directorate. 
b These numbers include landings of drift gillnets and from not-defined vessel’s length groups. Also include recruitment and research quotas. 
Source: Fisheries Directorate [4]. 
2 For a detailed review of resource allocation discourse, see [25,31,32].  
3 Each assembled gillnet is 27.5 m long and depending on the number of 
meshes in height, that varies between 30 and 50 meshes, it could be between 3 
and 5 m high [19,20]. 
4 Based on interviews to coastal fishermen conducted by NTNU-Sustainability 
in the summer–autumn 2017 [11].  
5 Based on the number of reported lost gillnets (Gjermund Langedal, Fisheries 
Directorate 2020, pers. comm). 
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over a long distance before settling again and its position will be lost. 
Similarly, in the event of gear collisions, gillnets may be displaced and 
drift far from their original position, and it would be impossible to locate 
them. 
Gillnets are lost every year in key fishing grounds for commercially 
important fish species and the magnitude of the losses each year is cu-
mulative. Considering that only 50–60% of the reported lost gillnets are 
retrieved every year, the remaining lost gear continues accumulating at 
sea and may ghost fish for decades (Fig. 4). Many studies attempted to 
estimate the fish mortality rates and the extent of ghost fishing, but the 
majority contain significant levels of uncertainty [13]. Carr and Cooper 
[43] estimated that groundfish gillnets with a soaking time of at least 
four years could catch approximately 15% of the commercial catch 
rates. In Norway, Humborstad et al. [44] estimated that the catch effi-
ciency of lost gillnets tended to stabilize after 21–45 days at sea, 
maintaining 20–30% of the initial efficiency and continuing fishing at 
this rate for several years. 
To illustrate the extent and magnitude of NEA cod ghost fishing in 
Norway, we provide in Table 2 a rough estimate of the accumulated 
number of lost gillnets using the estimates from the Fisheries Directorate 
[12] and those from the Norwegian Environment Agency [11], the 
amount of NEA cod caught by the lost gear over a period of one, five and 
ten years and today’s first-hand value of this unintended catch. The 
estimate is based on the landings per vessel-length group (Table 1) and 
assuming that: (i) the mean number of fishing days at sea is 30, during 
the winter season (January–April); (ii) the mean number of gillnets used 
by a coastal vessel is 151; (iii) the number of reported lost gillnets per 
year is around 1 000 units and they are lost in commercially important 
fishing grounds; (iv) 50% of reported lost gillnets are successfully 
retrieved every year, (v) lost gillnets maintain at least 15% of the catch 
efficiency that new gillnets have; (vi) the catch efficiency of lost gillnets 
is fairly stable for at least ten years. 
Based on the Fisheries Directorate’s data, the results of this estima-
tion report a potential accumulated number of 5 000 lost gillnets over a 
period of ten years, and an accumulated volume of 24 288 tonnes of NEA 
cod caught by ghost fishing. This volume is equivalent to almost 3.1% of 
the TAC of NEA cod for 2019. Today’s first-hand value of a catch 
resulting from ten years of ghost fishing would be equivalent to 517 
million NOK (Table 2). When using the Norwegian Environmental 
Agency’s data, the potential accumulated number of lost gillnets reaches 
137,000 over a period of ten years, with an accumulated volume of 666 
458 tonnes of NEA cod caught by ghost fishing. Since it is uncertain for 
how long gillnets keep ghost fishing and at which catch rates after 1, 5 
and 10 years, the results from 5 and 10 years in particular, should be 
taken cautiously. Despite the uncertainties in our estimate, we observe 
that the accumulated number of lost gillnets, catch rates from ghost 
fishing and the potential first-hand value are substantial and highly 
significant. These figures illustrate that ghost fishing has a negative 
impact on the NEA cod fish stocks and on the economic efficiency of the 
fishery. 
To prevent the negative effect of LADFG, the development and use of 
biodegradable gillnets to replace nylon gillnets has been proposed and 
has gained significant attention. Biodegradable gillnets maintain similar 
mechanical properties as conventional nylon gillnets during fishing 
operations, but are completely degraded in seawater by naturally 
occurring microorganisms, such as bacteria, fungi and algae, when 
dispersed in the marine environment [45]. Hence, replacing traditional 
nylon gillnets with biodegradable alternatives can significantly reduce 
ghost fishing and marine plastic litter (from macro- to microplastics) 
caused by non-degradable lost gillnets [46]. In the last decade, biode-
gradable gillnets have been widely studied [47–54] and are currently 
being used in commercial fisheries in South Korea, China, and Japan. 
Since 2016, biodegradable gillnets have also been intensively tested in 
Norwegian gillnet fisheries targeting NEA cod (Gadus morhua), saithe 
(Pollachius virens) and Greenland halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides) to 
reduce the negative impacts of LADFG [18–20]. However, commercial 
fishing trials show that biodegradable gillnets are 21% less efficient and 
twice as expensive as conventional nylon gillnets [20]. To illustrate the 
Fig. 3. Position of retrieved gillnets along the coast of northern Norway, 2017–2019. The red circles indicate retrieved lost gear and the green circles indicate 
reported lost, but not found, gear. 
Source: Fisheries Directorate [12]. 
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effect of replacing nylon with biodegradable gillnets on the economy of 
a coastal gillnetter, it is worth considering an example provided by 
Grimaldo et al. [20] of a 10.9 m coastal vessel fishing for NEA cod with 
gillnets during the winter season in northern Norway. If all his six sets of 
nylon gillnets (120 in total) were replaced by biodegradable gillnets, 
fishing operations would have led to a 21% reduction of the total catch 
of NEA cod, decreasing from 97 to 77 tonnes, which corresponds to 
approximately a 0.51 million NOK loss in gross revenue. Moreover, as 
biodegradable gillnets are twice as expensive as nylon gillnets, the 
additional cost of using 120 biodegradable gillnets would amount to 
36,000 NOK. 
Overall, the total increased costs due to the 21% reduction in catch 
efficiency and the higher cost of biodegradable gillnets, equal 0.54 
million NOK. In order to maintain the same gross catch rates usually 
obtained with nylon gillnets, vessels would need to increase either the 
number of gillnets deployed (by 25 gillnets) or the amount of time spent 
fishing at sea (an extra 5.4 days). This compensation strategy would not 
only increase fuel consumption per kg of caught fish for the vessel using 
biodegradable gillnets, but it would also limit fishing operations and 
potential alternative income for other fisheries using traditional nylon 
gillnets. From an economic perspective, this example shows that 
biodegradable gillnets cannot compete with traditional nylon gillnets in 
terms of efficiency. Lower catch efficiency and increased costs, thus, 
represent the main reason why fishermen are unwilling to replace 
traditional nylon gillnets with biodegradable ones. In addition, the 
operational costs are low in this fleet during the peak season. As they 
also may have free operating days, due to limited quotas, there may be 
limited alternative costs at this part of the year. In addition, a lower 
CPUE may contribute positively for the society, as it reduces the sea-
sonality and adds capacity to improve the fish quality. 
4. Discussion 
For fishermen, the use of nylon gillnets represents the most efficient 
adaptation, while biodegradable gillnets yield reduced catches, require 
extra costs, and increase fuel consumption per kg. of caught fish. 
However, while being the most efficient fishing gear, nylon gillnets that 
remain dispersed at sea for years contribute to the NEA cod stock 
depletion and ultimately impose collective costs to all gear and vessel 
groups harvesting this species (between 517 and 1 418 million NOK 
annually as estimated in Table 2). Additionally, ghost fishing introduces 
uncertainties in resource management because fish mortality becomes 
more complicated to calculate. 
The short-term individual gains from using nylon gillnets and the 
long-term collective costs imposed by ghost fishing reveal how the in-
dividual- and collective rationalities work against each other, when 
managing limited and common fish resources. This conflict is described 
as the "prisoners dilemma" in game theory and in the common property 
theory [39,55]. As the employment of either nylon or biodegradable 
gillnets is optional in Norway under the current policy, the use of 
biodegradable gillnets is generally disregarded by individual fishermen, 
as it is less efficient and more expensive than nylon gillnets. Moreover, 
for the individual gillnet fishermen considering using biodegradable 
gillnets, they do not know the other fishermen’s willingness to use 
biodegradable gillnets. Hence, the potential effects from using biode-
gradable gillnets, are not only a matter of their own individual choices 
but also depends on other fishers behaviour. Therefore, the collective 
effects derived from each individual choice to employ this gear remain 
uncertain. 
Compared to nylon gillnets, fishermen who are willing to use 
biodegradable gillnets, also risk facing economic losses. Hence, as long 
as the individual fishermen have no guarantee that they will obtain a 
reward because of their own self-imposed limitations, they are unwilling 
to voluntarily replace nylon gillnets with biodegradable ones. Decisive 
action aimed at the removal of ghost fishing and the consequent 
decrease in fishing mortality (F), are thus hard to achieve. On the con-
trary, the single fisherman finds it rational to use the most effective 
fishing gear. The reason is that harvesting with nylon gillnets benefits 
the individual fisherman, while the costs of overfishing, due to ghost 
Fig. 4. Photograph showing a 30–40-year-old lost gillnet retrieved off the coast 
of Tromsø (Northern Norway) with newly caught NEA cod and saithe (Polla-
chius virens). The use of plastic rings to provide buoyancy to the gillnets was a 
technique used in the 1980s. Since the early 1990s, ropes containing floating 
elements are commonly used as float lines. 
Source: Roger B. Larsen, the Arctic University of Norway, 2017. 
Table 2 
Estimated number of lost gillnets, volume of NEA cod (tonnes) caught by ghost fishing and the catch value (million NOK) for a 1, 5, and 10-year prediction.61 The 
estimates of lost gillnets provided by the Fisheries Directorate and Norwegian Environmental Agency are used in the prediction.   
1 years 5 years 10 years  
Fisheries Directorate N. Env. Agency Fisheries Directorate N. Env. Agency Fisheries Directorate N. Env. Agency 
Accumulated number of lost gillnets 500 13,700 2500 68,600 5000 137,000 
Catch efficiency (%) 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ghost fishing of NEA cod (tonnes) 2429 66,646 12,144 333,229 24 288 666,458 
21.3 NOK per kga 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 
First-hand value (million NOK) 51.7 1 418 258.4 7 091 517 14,182  
a Average price per kg of cod landed by the coastal gillnets fleet in 2019. 
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fishing, are shared with the entire fishing fleet harvesting the NEA cod 
stock. Consequently, gillnet fisheries lack economic incentives to replace 
nylon gillnets with less efficient biodegradable gillnets. Collective action 
among gear and vessels groups and an institutional framework are 
needed to provide those incentives, which would promote the use of 
more environmentally sustainable gillnets. 
Similar to other gear- and vessel groups, such as trawlers, long-line 
etc, coastal vessels (gillnet included) are allocated individual vessel 
quotas from a national TAC (cf. Fig. 1). Hence, the use of nylon gillnets 
and the consequent negative effects of ghost fishing, related to a higher 
fishing mortality (F), represent an extra cost for all groups harvesting the 
NEA cod stock. Due to the strong political position of coastal fisheries, 
especially in the high north, the problem posed by ghost fishing is not 
only a question of technology (i.e. type of fishing gear). It is also directly 
connected to the institutional framework of the management system. As 
modern fisheries are managed by- and through institutions [56], a 
central question is to what extent an institutional approach may effec-
tively favour the implementation of biodegradable gillnets in NEA cod 
fisheries. 
According to Ostrom [55], common property theory puts forth 
fundamental strategies within the fisheries sector; it proposes the 
establishment of an external sphere of authority with the right to rule 
over common fish resources, but also to implement incentives and/or 
restrictions to the management regime. For the strategic options to 
successfully reduce ghost fishing, institutional change may be required 
to transform the individual fishers’ basic context of rationality towards a 
more collective rationality of resource sustainability. Hence, the suc-
cessful or poor performance of fisheries management and the ability to 
address future sustainability issues (i.e., ghost fishing), may be a ques-
tion of institutional design. 
In South Korea, the use of biodegradable gillnets is promoted by the 
government and fishermen get monetary subsidies to compensate for 
using biodegradable nets with a lower catch efficiency and at higher 
costs [57]. However, public financial support to fisheries using specific 
fishing gear, is not a relevant approach in Norway.7 Other public ini-
tiatives may be relevant, such as e.g. fees or area regulations according 
to access to relevant fishing grounds. However, the latter would un-
dermine the profound idea of coastal fisheries while fees could be 
complex to administer. 
Replacing nylon gillnets for environmentally friendly biodegradable 
gillnets is not a technical problem. It is a management problem that 
demands an institutional approach. As different gear- and vessel groups 
are allocated vessel-quotas from a common TAC, addressing the problem 
of gillnet substitution and institutional change, may be connected to the 
use of quota resource allocation regime to achieve specific policy goals. 
To support the decision-making process, a better data collection of lost 
gillnets, should thus be prioritized. 
Especially within the Norwegian NEA cod fishery, a tradition exists 
of using specific quota-shares actively as incentives to promote specific 
policy goals outlined by the government. For 2018, such policy goals 
refer for example to a specific quota-bonus (4 000 tonnes) to stimulate 
catch-based aquaculture (CBA) for live storage of wild-caught NEA cod 
[8], specific NEA cod quotas (7 000 tonnes) to stimulate recreational 
fisheries and the recruitment of young fishermen, quotas for research 
and development at research institutions (703 tonnes) and a significant 
quota of NEA cod (17,200 tonnes) as bycatch quota to increase harvest 
of the allocated haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus) quotas within the 
coastal fleet. An important element is that all these NEA cod quotas are 
deducted directly from the national TAC, before sharing among groups. 
However, the bycatch quota (17,200 tonnes) specifically earmarked for 
the coastal fleet (closed group), is earmarked directly from the closed 
group’s specific group quota. The allocated quota shares for the three 
first policy goals are thus collectively financed by all gear- and vessel 
groups, as outlined in Fig. 1, while the bycatch quota for the coastal fleet 
is deducted from the coastal fleets’ own group quota.8 
In a regulative institutional perspective, measures such as the quota- 
bonus to increase CBA, could parallel a public incentive to stimulate an 
increased use of biodegradable gillnets. In this scenario (alternative 1), 
gillnet fisheries using biodegradable gillnets would, thus, be allocated 
an extra quota-bonus to compensate for the use of less efficient and more 
expensive gear. With the support of a full compensation, fishermen will 
not suffer economic losses. However, as the quota-bonus earmarked for 
CBA is deducted directly from the total TAC before sharing among 
groups, this alternative would imply that all the other groups (such as 
the trawlers, long-liners etc.) would contribute with quotas to promote 
the use of biodegradable gillnets. Therefore, this approach leads to a 
reallocation of quotas among groups and lower the trawlers’ and long- 
liners’ relative quota shares of NEA cod stock to promote the use of 
biodegradable gillnets. 
Another approach (alternative 2), that does not involve resource 
allocations or quota subsidies from all other gear and vessel groups, can 
be described as a zero-sum game within the specific gillnet fishery. Here, 
quota shares may be reduced for fisheries employing nylon gillnets and 
reallocated to the users of biodegradable gillnets. 
For both alternatives, if fishing with biodegradable gillnets is awar-
ded a full compensation for potential economic losses, this compensa-
tion in terms of extra quota-shares, should equal 21% of the efficiency 
loss and of the extra cost of biodegradable gillnets, as described in 
Grimaldo et al. [20]. 
However, regardless of the model or approach to reduce nylon gill-
nets and stimulate the use of biodegradable gillnets with extra quotas, a 
transfer of quotas will create severe resource allocation conflicts among 
different gear and vessel groups (alternative 1) or within the gillnet 
fishery sector alone (alternative 2). In the short term, an annual-based 
reallocation of quotas will be perceived as an instant quota-loss by 
other fisheries, while biodegradable gillnet fisheries will gain extra 
quotas. However, in the long term, the use of biodegradable gillnets, will 
decrease the amount of adult NEA cod caught by ghost fishing, 
contributing to a potential larger stock biomass. Hence, elimination of 
ghost fishing, will benefit all gear and vessel groups harvesting NEA cod. 
With a better understanding of how smart technologies can improve 
materials, it is expected that future biodegradable gillnets will reach an 
efficiency closer to todays’ nylon nets. Therefore, the compensation for 
lost efficiency and higher costs associated with biodegradable gillnets 
may be gradually phased out in the future. However, during the tran-
sition period it is obviously necessary to provide effective incentives for 
the introduction of biodegradable gillnets, and the gradual replacement 
of nylon nets. 
In this context, the powerful organization, the Norwegian Fisher-
men’s Association organizes both coastal- and deep-sea vessels, and thus 
constitute a major position to unite different fishers towards collective 
gains [32]. 
Another alternative (alternative 3) could be to impose a taxation to 
the use of nylon gillnets that equals to the lack of efficiency when using 
biodegradable gillnets, a strategy which would remove the economic 
benefit from using nylon gillnets. Decision makers, such as central au-
thorities and politicians, also constitute the power to simply ban the use 
specific technologies, e.g. nylon gillnets, especially when alternative 
technologies exist. However, due to the strong position of gillnets to 
maintain the smallest coastal fleet, a ban would impact the structure of 
6 Based on the annual number of reported lost gillnets per year in commer-
cially important fishing grounds for NEA cod [30] and the mean price per kg of 
NEA cod landed by the gillnet fishery in 2019 [41]. 
7 The public financial support regime, known as the Main Agreement be-
tween the government and The Norwegian Fishermen’s Association, was ended 
in 2000 [58]. 
8 For a detailed overview of NEA cod resource allocation for 2018–2019, see 
[32]. 
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coastal fleet adaptations. A large part of the coastal fleet is too small to 
operate alternative fishing gears, e.g. demersal seine or automatic line 
systems. As such, vessel must be rebuilt or replaced by larger- and more 
capital-intensive vessels, an approach which may demand a larger 
quota-base and increased market orientation of the quota regime.9 
As nylon gillnets have proven more catch-efficient than biodegrad-
able gillnets, this article discusses the possibility to reallocate fish re-
sources to reduce the use of nylon gillnets and stimulate the use of less 
catch-efficient biodegradable gillnets, to avoid ghost fishing. However, 
the discourse about different fishing gears that prevail in society should 
not only correspond to which fishing gear are the most catch efficient. In 
a larger context the potential use of the resource allocation regime to 
achieve specific policy goals, other sustainability attributes, such as e.g. 
fish quality or fuel intensity are vital for economic performance and 
value-adding of available fish resources. The use of resource allocation 
among different gear- and vessel groups could thus be expanded from a 
"narrow" discussion between nylon- and biodegradable gillnets, to a 
larger debate about the use of alternative technologies to reduce the use 
of gillnets in general. However, such an approach would trigger a debate 
where different stakeholders will address different sustainability attri-
butes and technological choices, depending on their fixed place in so-
ciety. Also, area regulations of different fishing gears and vessel size are 
widely used in modern fisheries management to achieve specific policy 
goals, e.g. catch profiles and organize fisheries between different gear- 
and vessel groups.10 Hence, such management measures could also be 
more specifically implemented to the gillnet fishery, e.g. a ban or re-
striction to the use of nylon gillnets in weather exposed areas or where 
the losses of gillnets are significantly higher than in other areas (c.f. 
Fig. 3). As the resource allocation regime connects to technical input 
regulations, resource sharing among fishermen thus represents a 
powerful management tool to address specific policy goals. While 
resource allocation has traditionally been a question exclusively be-
tween the Fishermen’s Association and the fisheries department in a 
corporative bargaining model, relatively newcomers such as environ-
mental NGOs and sustainability labels (e.g., the MSC), have gained 
significant roles in the sustainability discourse. The MSC holds a 
powerful position in regards to sustainable approval and market access 
for the most important global commercial fisheries (www.msc.org). 
While the MSC-certification standards originally corresponded to sole 
biological management principles (such as maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY), precautionary approach (PA) criteria determined by safe limits 
for size of spawning biomass, productiveness and limits for fishing 
mortality, LADFG is now being gradually included as a supplementary 
sustainability attribute. According to MSC: [15]. 
"We are working with NGOs, fishery managers and scientists to see 
how we (MSC) can improve the MSC Fisheries Standard’s re-
quirements around ghost gear. We want our Standard to reflect the 
current best practice in management of abandoned, lost- or discarded 
fishing gear. If any part of the Standard is revised, a new version will be 
released in March 2022." 
This means that aspects related to LADFG may be implemented as 
sustainability attributes in MSC Fisheries Standards by 2022. The 
maintenance of the MSC-certification and best available market-access 
for the NEA cod fishery should encourage gillnet fisheries to see a 
clear advantage in using biodegradable gillnets. However, what will be 
the acceptable standards related to LADFG within the frame of MSC, 
may be subject to debate among legitimate stakeholders. In this context, 
sustainability labels and the best market access may impact the transi-
tion towards the use of biodegradable gillnets. However, a quota 
compensation for the use of less efficient biodegradable gillnets, will 
ease the transition. Here, the options may include a full compensation, a 
public decree to ban nylon gillnets and a control system to enforce the 
use of biodegradable gillnets, a partial quota-compensation, or a 
voluntarily approach. The future status of the gillnet fisheries depends 
on negotiations and interpretations of values and norms based on the 
principles of sustainability and on the ability of stakeholders to address 
the problem and find a future solution. 
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